

increased political strength. At the same time, however, Shankland argues that the turn of these people toward political Islam should be seen only as one among various approaches adopted in the modernization process (p. 130). There are still major groups in Turkey that counterbalance the Islamic revival. The majority of young people and women, especially in the cities, and the unorthodox Islamic Alevi minority (approximately twenty percent of the population, p. 136) are mentioned as important social groups in opposition to political Islam. Here, Shankland emphasizes the socially heterogeneous character of Turkey. Political Islam should thus be considered "as only one of a multiplicity of developing lifestyles in Turkey" (p. 94).

In the Introduction and in the chapter "Religion and the State," Shankland presents a general historical outline and an introduction to the subject, discussing the main historical developments throughout the Republican period. In the chapters "The Organisation of Belief" and "Tari-kats, Belief and the State," he examines institutions that have played important roles in the process of the re-introduction of religion. These institutions include trusts, associations, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the *imam-hatip* schools (schools at the lycée level that offer primarily religious subjects, such as studies of the Koran and Arabic, in their curricula—they were closed in 1999 with the introduction of eight years' obligatory secular education). Sufi orders, such as the Mevlevi and the Nurcu movement, the latter one of the most successful Islamic revivalist movements, are presented. The historical backgrounds of these movements, as well as their present functions, in particular their relations with active political parties, are given. A point underlined by Shankland is that in spite of the official ban on such religious groups, their existence has come to be accepted by the state, which has not pursued a rigorous fight against them. The resurgence of Islam, thus, has not occurred without the state's knowledge.

In the chapters "Political Islam: The Rise of Erbakan" and "Erbakan: Fall and Reaction," this resurgence, as expressed in the Welfare Party and its leader Necmettin Erbakan, is more closely studied. These chapters are mainly factual presentations of political developments from the 1970s onward. Finally, in the last chapter, "The Emergence of the Alevis," Shankland gives a general overview of Alevi culture and beliefs. This account is limited. It is, for example, a highly questionable approach to treat the Alevis as a homogeneous group since from a political point of view, there exist immense differences between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. Shankland acknowledges the limitations of his study—which he was continuing at the time of writing—and pleads for indulgence of his decision to include this chapter, since he sees this unorthodox Islamic group as constituting a counter-movement against resurgent political Islam. A comprehensive understanding of orthodox, political Islam in Turkey, therefore, requires in-

clusion of the Alevis (p. 12).

In general, the book is primarily oriented toward an audience unfamiliar with modern Turkish history and, therefore, is of an introductory and general nature. This is perhaps inevitable given the long period investigated. Various aspects of Islam in different historical contexts are discussed. In this sense, Shankland's book offers a good overview of and introduction to the question of religion in Turkey. Shankland's extensive use of secondary sources is supplemented by the use of oral narratives from his own field research. Quotations of these oral narratives are included arbitrarily, however, with the result that some of them appear as single-case stories the importance of which to the general conclusions is disputable. The reader is left with unanswered questions such as by whom, where, and when the primary material used in the work was gathered. Answers to these questions and more detailed information on the field research undertaken and used in the work would have helped to highlight the importance of these sources for this study.

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Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-17. Yüzyıllar)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998. Pp. 418.

The role of religious ideology in the constitution of the Ottoman state has been a privileged subject of investigation at least since Paul Wittck expounded his "gazi thesis" two generations ago. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, who is perhaps best known to the occidental readership through his work on the Selcuk-era Baba Resul revolt and the Ottoman-era heterodox sufi and Kızılbaş movements, remains one of a few historians to approach questions of religious orthodoxy and deviance less as geopolitical or theological concerns than as aspects of shifting social power and changing mentalities within Islamic societies. *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, in this sense, is the culmination of much of Ocak's previous work. As such, it seeks to provide a comprehensive look at religious heterodoxy in the Ottoman Empire as an urban, intellectual, anti-centrist societal movement. This book should be of interest and importance not only to the Ottomanist, but to anyone concerned with heresy in Islamic history. For this reason, it may be useful to provide here a somewhat detailed summary.

The work comprises five chapters which treat, in turn, the nature of official Ottoman religious ideology; the socio-ideological roots of anti-conformist intellectuals; the case of Bedreddin Simaveni; heretics among

the high Ottoman *ulema*; and the adepts of pantheist mysticism. They are preceded by a lengthy introduction on the roots of *zandaka* and *ilhad* in early Islamic history. Though both terms often came to denote atheism or dissoluteness in the widest sense, the identification of religious free thought particularly with *zandaka* as a secretive, tainted holdover from pre-Islamic religiosity equally would define official Ottoman attitudes (such as that of the famous sixteenth-century *Şeyhülislâm* Ibn Kemal). Ocak characterizes early *zandaka* as a form of intellectual resistance to (late) Umayyad Arab chauvinism, in a vein with the more populist Shu'ubiyya movement, and suggests a twofold typology: "mass *zandaka*," whether the widespread quietist confession that survived until the time of the 'Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813-833 C.E.), or the Khurasan-centered revolutionary groups rallied around the memory of the early 'Abbasid proselyte Abu Muslim; and "intellectual *zandaka*," the subject of this study in an Ottoman context. The latter movement was in vogue among elite circles between 760 and 900 C.E., when it was gradually displaced by other pursuits such as rationalist philosophy.

Five categories of the largely Persian 'Abbasid-era elite—bureaucrats, littérateurs, theologians, philosophers, and *sufis*—were apt to display *zındık* tendencies, and a few of the individuals Ocak discusses in fact suffered persecution. Members of the last two groups, in particular, such as the ninth-century philosopher Ibn al-Rawandi and the *sufi* martyr Mansur al-Hallaj (d. 923), might speculate on *al-hiyya*, the divine nature of all creation, or the neoplatonist monism that would draw the most violent opposition from orthodox Muslim quarters. The ninth century especially witnessed an "inquisition" (*polisliye mücadelesi*) directed as much against *zandaka* as against Mu'tazilism. This twin assault on the pre-Islamic dualist and rationalist legacies coincided with both the theoretical elaboration of caliphal rule and the formation of the four orthodox *mezhebs*.⁶

Zandaka in early Islam thus is viewed here as a series of overlapping protests: that of the Mawālī against Arab cultural hegemony, that of the once-Manichean heresy against Zoroastrian orthodoxy now carried out in Islamic guise, and so on. An important turning point, according to Ocak (p. 60), occurs in the ninth century, when heresy gradually breaks out of its more narrowly Iranian confines and becomes, as *ilhad*, a more heterogeneous and outspokenly anti-religious movement under Greek philosophical and Indian impulses. Islam's political and legal apparatus, to which the Ottoman state and religious hierarchy would become heir, was

⁶The last point, perhaps, must be revised in light of Christopher Melchert's findings on the comparatively late development of the *mezhebs*; see his *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.* (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1997).

formed parallel with and largely in reaction to the heretical currents in early Islam.

The first chapter begins with a survey of the three principal sources of Ottoman political ideology: Turkic-Mongol notions of universal empire, the Umayyad-'Abbasid doctrine of universal caliphate, and the Roman-Byzantine concept of imperium. The weight of their respective influence is a classic subject of Ottomanist debate, but Ocak, the 1970s Strasbourg graduate, is interested primarily in the link between the ideology of the pre-modern state and the *mentalité* of its individual pillars. The unrefined "Turkish Islam" espoused by the Ottomans while still at the stage of a frontier beylicate hardly allowed for sophisticated distinctions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. In the fully-developed imperial ideology-cum-mentality, however, which equated the dynasty's fortune (*devlet*) with a universal mandate from God (*din*), what did the pursuit of *zandaka* by some individuals signify?

The author proceeds to analyze the constituent elements of what he terms "official Ottoman ideology." Ottoman political absolutism, which is made perfect with Fatih Mehmed's conquest of Constantinople in 1453, is characterized by the central importance of the dynastic house, whose collective endurance (*bekâ*?) is more important than the lives of its individual members; by its quality as a universal order (*nizam-ı âlem*) and authority by divine mandate (*saltanat-ı seniye*); and by its clear structural separation from the non-enfranchised subject class, the *raya*. This secular ideal is complemented by, and indeed fuses with, the most highly evolved religious *étatisme* in Islamic history. From its original ideal commitment to holy war (*gaza*) to the appropriation of the protectorship of the Holy Places and the caliphate following the defeat of the Mamluks, Ottoman statehood was to be identified with the cause of Islam. A turning point, Ocak argues, is reached in the early sixteenth century, when, in light of its war with Shi'ite Iran, the Ottoman Empire also begins to perceive itself as the guarantor of orthodoxy against intra-Islamic sedition.

This official ideological structure rests, in turn, on a highly developed state religious bureaucracy. By gradually engaging the *ulema* in a pattern of state service and state patronage, a process seen to have culminated with the institution of the *Şeyhülislâm* as the top religio-judicial functionary in the late sixteenth century, the Ottomans could build an ideology that equated their being with Islam itself. Yet the Islamic quality of this official ideology was not so much an end in itself as a medium of achieving the degree of centralized social control that was the hallmark of Ottoman power in the early modern period.

The theme of the *ulema*'s co-option by the state is resumed in the next chapter, where the author explores the social and ideological background of *zındıks* and *mülhids* in Ottoman society. In contrast to the Shi'ite

clerical hierarchy, the scholars of Sunni Islam were not possessed of any particular spiritual authority, and a Sunni clerical class developed only over time and incidentally to their specialization in religious and legal learning. A scholar's prestige even depended in large measure on his independence and freedom from official patronage, but this began to change with the widespread institution of state-sponsored *medreses* in the Selcuk period. Under the highly centralized Ottoman system, a scholar's career depended not on the quality of his learning, but on his *intisap* in Istanbul and his ability to land lucrative appointments in the state bureaucracy. The result, as first argued by Tayyib Gökbilgin and since reiterated by numerous Turkish historians, was an excessive concentration on such administrative disciplines as *fiqh* and *kalâm*, and a critical decline in the natural and philosophical sciences. Were those decried officially as *zındıks* and *mülhids*, the author asks (p. 119), truly adversaries of the Ottoman state, or merely in search of an alternative to the slow ossification of Sunni learning?

Turning next to the high *sufi* milieu as a breeding ground for heresy, Ocak provides a summary history of key *tarikas* and their role in the development of Ottoman society. (It is only regrettable that Ahmet Karamustafa's findings on the largely middle-class social backgrounds of Ottoman-era charismatic sufis have not been integrated into this section.)⁷ Whereas numerous pantheist and Melâmi currents participated in the rise of the early beylicate, these, too, came under increasing state control and surveillance in the course of the fifteenth century. In particular, the Anatolian Bayrami and Halveti orders were likely to foster *zandaka* movements, the reason being found in their doctrinal structure. *Wahdat al-wujûd*, or the monity of existence, was of course a leitmotif of all Ottoman sufism. The Bayramis and Halvetis, however, tended toward an outright materialist, pantheist interpretation that, combined with their organizational dependence on a *qutb-mahdî*, or personalized incarnation of the divine essence, made them prone to reject secular religious authority and attract attention as *zındıks*. Yet the ultimate intellectual source for all the *zandaka* and *ilhad* movements, Ocak argues (pp. 131ff.), is the strong undercurrent of Hurufi thought in Ottoman popular sufism. The doctrine of Fazlullah-ı Esterabadi, who would himself be considered the object of *hulûl* or messianic incarnation by his following, combined elements of kabbalism, neoplatonism, and Christianity, but above all was permeated with the cultified memory of Mansur al-Hallaj.

Şeyh Bedreddin (d. 1416), the most prominent heretic and rebel in Ottoman history, is the subject of the central portion of the book. Previous

historiography has made him everything from a sinister *bâtîni* to a leftist revolutionary. Ocak's own model in writing this chapter is rather Menocchio of Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* (English translation, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), as the author strives to reconstruct not just the Şeyh's life and rebellion but the societal and mental contexts in which they took place. On one hand, Bedreddin personified the ordinary religious scholar, displaying greater talent as a Hanefi *faqih* than as a sufi poet, and spending years in the retinue of the Mamluk sultan Barkuk (r. 1382-1399) before taking up service as Musa Çelebi's *kazasker* in Rumelia during the post-Timur interim period. On the other hand, he early manifested a penchant for pantheist mysticism under the influence of his teacher Hüseyin-i Ahlati, and sojourned in Tabriz, the author suggests, specifically to be trained in Hurufism. In 1415, he launched his (ultimately unsuccessful) revolt against the recently restored Sultan Mehmed I, relying on the support of such disparate parties as the Timurids, the notorious western Anatolian rebel *zındıks* Börklüce Mustafa and Torlak Kemal, and the Kalender dervishes, as well as the landed gentry of Rumelia. The only evidence of Bedreddin's own ideological vision, aside from a few disparaging remarks written by the historian Idris Bitlisi, is the *Vâridât*, an eclectic collection of his mystical ruminations compiled almost certainly by his followers after his death. The subsequent appropriation of Bedreddin by the Alevis of Rumelia as their spiritual forebear early caused the pall of heterodoxy to be projected back onto him. Yet, a biography composed by his own grandson claims he never sought to revolt against Ottoman rule, the respect afforded him at his trial further belying an incrimination for heresy.

Duly recognizing his debt toward Michel Balivet and others, Ocak makes a complex and intriguing case for the confessional nature of Bedreddin's quest on the basis of the religious syncretism prevalent in Rumelian and western Anatolian society at the time. The mass basis of his support in these areas adhered to various, in practice no longer quite distinguishable, heterodoxies such as Kalender sufism and Bogomilism, for which a messianic Hurufism could serve as an ideal common rallying point. Their respective doctrinal content, the reader must assume, was not as important as the fact that the adversities suffered by the common folk during the post-Timur period left them all receptive to any chiliastically-tinged message of hope. It is doubtful that Bedreddin envisaged either a Selcuk dynastic restoration in his own name or a socialist utopia. The fact that he seems to have genuinely conceived of himself as a messianic renewer, a *sâhib al-zuhûr* or *sâhib al-khurûj*, must be understood in terms of the religio-political language specific to the time and context of the Timurid conquests.

⁷Ahmet T. Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1220-1550* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1994).

Chapter Four deals with *zandaka* and *ilhad*, or behavior deemed to be such, among the high *ulema*. The limited and essentially polemical nature of the Ottoman sources does not allow for a quantitative assessment, but the essence of known cases suggests that religious heterodoxy was a widespread and variegated phenomenon within Istanbulite academia. Molla Lutfi, a towering figure at the court of Bayezid II (r. 1488-1512), was the most prominent individual to be condemned and executed for *zandaka* in the fifteenth century. Universally reviled among his jealous and insecure colleagues, Molla Lutfi was accused of immorality, stealing books entrusted to his care, declaring prayer to be inefficient, and beguiling the masses. Ocak, on the basis of an obscure treatise on *zandaka* wrongly attributed to Molla Lutfi's leading adversaries in the past, argues that there may have been some substance to the accusations, at least insofar as Molla Lutfi displayed philosophical proclivities. Even contemporary observers agreed, however, that the trial was entirely sham; moreover, Ocak explains, Molla Lutfi was never offered the chance to recant as stipulated under Hanefi law.

A secretive Jesus-devotion, or *Hubmesihilik*, at least according to the English ambassador Paul Rycaut, also was endemic in palace circles. Its most famous exponent, Molla Kabız, was executed in 1527, but not before outperforming and embarrassing the *kazaskers* in a theological debate at his first trial. Even after a furious *vezir* ordered a retrial, where he was in turn refuted by the superior talents of Ibn Kemal, Molla Kabız would not recant and willingly died for his conviction of Jesus' superiority. As other authors have remarked, the Jesus-cult was likely of eastern origin and ultimately grounded in Hurufism, as well. The Ottoman sources refer to other, more obscure examples of Muslim scholars with an abnormal interest in Christian or Jewish scripture. True, most reported sightings of crypto-Christians or of outright materialist atheists (*musirrûn*) stem from such interested western observers as Rycaut or Guillaume Postel, but their frequent recurrence underlines the pervasiveness of heterodox thought in the Ottoman capital.

The final chapter discusses pantheist anarchism in the Ottoman Empire. Its adepts belonged overwhelmingly to the Bayrami sufi order, which perpetuated the world-renouncing asceticism of the Khurasanian Melâmiye in Anatolia. The movement was primarily rural or village-based at first and closely associated, much like the more secular *fütüvvet* league, with the lower trade guilds. In the interest of dissimulating their extreme pantheist doctrine (*wahdat al-mawjûd*), Bayrami adepts infiltrated more licit *tarikas* rather than incorporate their own. They nevertheless maintained a secretive organizational structure centered on a succession of *qutb-mahdis*, or messianic epiphanies. Representing not just spiritual, but

also worldly authority, this *qutb*-messianism (again of Hurufi inspiration) constituted a direct attack on Ottoman legitimacy and, in consequence, the Ottomans subjected its followers to severe persecution. The author reconstructs the biographies of nearly a dozen sixteenth-century Bayrami, Hamzavi, and Gülşeni *şeyhs*, marshaling not only the details of their lives and indictments, but also the largely idealized stories (*menakibnames*) passed down by their adepts following their deaths. Perhaps the most prominent of these figures was the youthful Bayrami leader Oğlan Şeyh İsmail-i Maşûki, executed in 1538 after moving the order to Istanbul and abandoning the principle of quietism against the advice of his father. Using the *şeriat* court record of his trial and a treatise by the presiding judge, Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574), as well as a newly-discovered Bayrami account of the *şeyh's* life, Ocak neatly analyzes the societal dynamic of his heresy and its persecution in the imperial capital. Despite the mitigation efforts of Ebussuud, whose own father was close to Melâmi circles, Oğlan Şeyh's profession of a materialist, brazenly antinomian pantheism was incontrovertible. The Bayramis' cry of *Allah'ım!*, its shade of meaning slipping from "My God!" to "I am God!" had to be an intolerable subversion of public law and order in Istanbul.

Did all these movements represent a single, unified *karşı düşünce*, or counter-ideology, to the central authority? In conclusion, the author points out that while Ottoman *zandaka* first arose in the context of the political power vacuum of the early fifteenth century, it reached its peak during the sultanate of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Members of both the *ulema* and the *sufi* elite sometimes manifested their opposition to the ever more intrusive presence of the state by adopting an anarchic, pantheist counter-ideology, grounded in rational philosophy for the former and in mysticism for the latter. The intellectual content of these movements was not new, but rather evolved from the old tradition of oppositional thought in Islamic history. The influence of Hurufism was decisive, and continues to be so in contemporary Alevism. The government viewed these heterodox currents above all as a threat to its ideological hegemony, and fought them through the discourse of religious orthodoxy. More than a sectarian or spiritual phenomenon, these movements were a reaction to the political and social upheaval of the fifteenth and especially sixteenth centuries, and expressed themselves in the same religious language employed by the central Ottoman authority.

While the above summary cannot do full justice to the intricate arguments of this book, three points may be singled out here for criticism. On a purely technical level, the author does not clearly delineate his definition of dualism and dualist heresies. He ascribes dualist leanings to the likes of Başşar b. Burd (d. ca. 783) (p. 31) and Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Zakariyya al-Razi (ca. 865-ca. 925) (p. 46), it would seem, solely for

their coupling of faith with ratio, without indicating whether they in fact subscribed to a twin cosmogony of good and evil. Elsewhere, when discussing the movements inspired by Bedreddin or Hamza Bali, the author presents messianism as an inherent feature of dualist sects. Though this was generally true for Ismaili (and sometimes true for Nusayri) Shi'ism, it is not clear why there should be a necessary link. Of the European examples Ocak cites, Catharism certainly was dualist and connected with Bogomilism, but it neither sparked messianic movements nor, much less, was it present in western Anatolia, the Aegean, or the Balkans (cf. p. 183). Waldensians, on the other hand, did at times exhibit messianic tendencies; however, they were nothing if not vehemently anti-dualist (cf. p. 292).

Another question concerns Ocak's concept of "official ideology." The book's great credit lies in the way it shows how heresy in the Ottoman period evolved diachronically, in reciprocity with and in reaction to the ideology defended by the state. However, the argument can be turned around to show that orthodox ideology is every bit as much the product, created in time, of its heretical mirror-image.⁸ The author states as much himself in his discussion of *zandaka* and orthodoxy under the 'Abbasids, but then portrays a rigid and unchanging Sunnism as the "official ideology" of the Ottomans over a period of 300 years. It remains to be investigated whether individuals such as Ođlan Őeyh were executed in the sixteenth century because their claims to be the *mahdi* were an affront to staid Sunni orthodoxy, or because they in fact rivaled the sultan's own messianic pretensions.

Finally, the author takes care to show the intellectual and historical continuity of Ottoman with 'Abbasid-era *zandaka* thought. From a social history point of view, however, Ottoman society's most immediate predecessor, in terms of its early modern military and bureaucratic system, its economy and infrastructure, and its reliance on Islamic judicature and political symbolism, is Mamluk society. Not surprisingly, cases of *zandaka* or the persecution of leading jurists by jealous colleagues are absolutely legion in Mamluk history,⁹ and these precedents would have had at least as much bearing on the problem of *zındıks* and *mülhids* in Ottoman society as the thought of Ibn al-Rawandi. Furthermore, as parts of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and Syria remained as susceptible to heretical activity and

⁸See R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁹Eliyahu Ashtor (E. Strauss), "L'inquisition dans l'état Mamlouk," *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 25 (1950): 11-26; Ulrich Haarmann, "Die Leiden des Qadi ibn as-Sa'ig," in H.R. Roemer and Albrecht Noth, eds., *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des vorderen Orients: Festschrift für Bertold Spuler zum 70. Geburtstag* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), pp. 108-122.

its official repression as the Rumelian and Anatolian provinces; one need recall only the persecution of Twelver Shi'ite *ulema* or the execution of Yahya b. 'İsa al-Karaki of al-Salt, convicted in 1610 on the basis of his treatises on *zandaka*.¹⁰

These comments, however, do not so much reflect actual shortcomings as they pay tribute to the book's wealth of information and novelty of interpretation, which leave the reader eager for yet more. The author has again contributed much original research, several key documents being published or translated for the first time in the appendix. Above all, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler* turns to full profit Ocak's impressive command of the often extremely disparate Turkish, Arabic, and Persian source materials, as well as his critical dialogue with both contemporary Turkish and Orientalist literature. Professor Ocak has provided a masterful and provocative synthesis of the social history of heresy in Ottoman society, which will not soon see its like. This particular series of the Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı is devoted mainly to producing high-quality translations of the most prominent works of recent western Ottomanist scholarship. It is perhaps time to turn the tables and make a translation of this important work available to the English-language readership.

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Ali Akyıldız, *Mümin ve Müşrif bir Padişah Kızı Refia Sultan*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998. Pp. 153. 3,250,000 TL.

The tradition of writing biography in Ottoman history has been limited to a few works. The present study by Ali Akyıldız is a preliminary attempt at filling this gap by focusing on a neglected area of Ottoman historiography, that is, the lives of Ottoman princesses. This large lacuna in historical scholarship has been due partly to the absence of autobiographical information on the lives of individual rulers and their families during the pre-modern era, although archival sources and historical narratives abound on the public achievements of Ottoman sultans and their consorts. Fortunately, there are more biographical sources available on the members of the Ottoman dynasty and ruling class during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹¹ Despite the existence of more biographies and memoirs

¹⁰Najm al-Din Ghazzi (1570-1651), *Lutf al-samar wa-qatf al-thamar* (Damascus, 1982), pp. 698-708.

¹¹For the reign of Abdülmecid I and the harem, see *The Imperial Harem of the Sultans*: